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The public and clinicians have long-held beliefs that
pneumonic plague is highly contagious; inappropriate
alarm and panic have occurred during outbreaks. We
investigated communicability in a naturally occurring pneu-
monic plague cluster. We defined a probable pneumonic
plague case as an acute-onset respiratory illness with
bloody sputum during December 2004 in Kango
Subcounty, Uganda. A definite case was a probable case
with laboratory evidence of Yersinia pestis infection. The
cluster (1 definite and 3 probable cases) consisted of 2
concurrent index patient–caregiver pairs. Direct fluorescent
antibody microscopy and polymerase chain reaction testing
on the only surviving patient’s sputum verified plague infec-
tion. Both index patients transmitted pneumonic plague to
only 1 caregiver each, despite 23 additional untreated close
contacts (attack rate 8%). Person-to-person transmission
was compatible with transmission by respiratory droplets,
rather than aerosols, and only a few close contacts, all with-
in droplet range, became ill. 
N
aturally occurring plague occurs most frequently in
bubonic or septicemic forms and is usually acquired
through the bite of an infected rodent flea. Bubonic and
septicemic plague are not transmissible from person to per-
son, but if left untreated, plague bacteria can spread
hematogenously to the lungs, resulting in secondary pneu-
monic plague. Pneumonic plague is contagious through
infectious respiratory secretions, potentially resulting in
direct airway infection (primary pneumonic plague)
among close contacts (1,2).
Pneumonic plague epidemics in China early in the 20th
century killed tens of thousands of persons (3). Plague is
now rare in developed countries. However, the possibility
of an intentional aerosol release of plague bacteria causing
numerous contagious primary pneumonic plague cases has
been a top concern of bioterrorism specialists (1).
Consequently, Yersinia pestis release scenarios have been
used in large-scale bioterrorism preparedness drills (4,5).
The possibility of pneumonic plague importation’s causing
an outbreak in a nonendemic region is also a concern (6). 
In-country panic and international alarm followed the
1994 report of pneumonic plague in India (7). Physicians
reportedly fled Surat, the affected city, stating that there
was “nothing to be done,” and tetracycline was hoarded in
areas distant from the reported outbreak (7). Some com-
mercial airline flights (8) and exports (7) from India were
cancelled. English physicians contested their public health
officials’ description of plague’s low communicability
based on their clinical training and infectious disease text-
books (9). Commercial repercussions for India have been
estimated at US $3–$4 billion (7). Similarly and more
recently, thousands fled a suspected pneumonic plague
outbreak in the Congo during 2005 (10).
The public and clinicians have long-held beliefs that
pneumonic plague is highly communicable (9,11–13). The
current Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA)
summary on Y. pestis as a bioterrorism agent notes second-
ary transmission risk is not well-quantified (14). Because
of its rarity, recent published observations on its conta-
giousness are scarce, and few clinicians have first-hand
knowledge of the disease. 
We describe pneumonic plague’s communicability and
clinical course in a recently investigated cluster. On
December 26, 2004, a Ugandan police officer telephoned a
local physician (author G.A.) about a cluster of deaths in
that country’s West Nile region. The physician initiated an
investigation that day and was joined the next day by US
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) staff
who were in the area for a plague treatment trial.
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The surviving patient, caregivers and healthcare
providers of the ill, and other close contacts of the
deceased were interviewed to understand how the outbreak
was propagated and to identify close contacts needing pro-
phylaxis. The surviving patient’s clinicians (G.A. and
Z.A.) provided clinical information. Because CDC and the
Ugandan Ministry of Health were conducting a plague
treatment trial in the area, prospective enhanced surveil-
lance for plague was already ongoing in the West Nile
region, involving at least weekly local health center visits.
For this enhanced surveillance, a probable bubonic plague
case was defined as an illness with fever and tender lym-
phadenopathy without another cause for lymphadenopathy
(e.g., cellulitis or streptococcal pharyngitis). For this clus-
ter investigation, we conducted additional retrospective
pneumonic plague surveillance by interviewing private
drug shop owners, business owners, traditional healers,
and other area residents. We defined a probable pneumon-
ic plague case as respiratory illness of acute onset with
cough producing grossly bloody sputum during December
2004 in Kango Subcounty, Nebbi District, Uganda. For
this investigation, we defined a definite pneumonic plague
case as a probable case with laboratory evidence of plague
infection.
Laboratory Methods 
The surviving patient’s sputum and serum samples
were tested for direct and indirect evidence of plague
infection. Sputum was placed on blood agar plates to
recover live organisms, tested by polymerase chain reac-
tion (PCR) for evidence of Y. pestis DNA, reacted with flu-
orescent-labeled antibody specific for Y. pestis and
analyzed by fluorescent microscopy, and assessed for Y.
pestis antigen by using 2 handheld immunochromato-
graphic assays (i.e., dipsticks) (TetraCore, Inc.,
Gaithersburg, MD, USA, and New Horizons, Columbia,
MD, USA). Serum samples collected during the acute
phase of the disease were tested for antibody to F1 antigen
of Y. pestis (15).
Extraction of DNA and PCR
The genes caf1, repA1, and pla were analyzed by PCR.
CDC has used these primers for many years for recogni-
tion of Y. pestis DNA. Primer sequences were caf1-f 5′-
ATACTGCAGATGAAAAAAATCAGTTCC-3′,  caf1-r
5′-ATAAAGCTTTTATTG GTTAGATACGGT-3′; repA1-f
5′-AGGCCCTGTTCACACATC-3′,  repA1-r 5′-CCGGG
TGTAGTTATTGTTCC-3′; and pla-f 5′-ATCTTACTTTC-
CGTGAGAA-3′, pla-r 5′-CTTGGATGTTGA GCTTCC-
TA-3′. Basic local alignment and sequencing tool analysis
against all known sequences in GenBank demonstrated no
significant homologies outside Y. pestis for caf1 and pla
primers. The repA1 primer set also has 100% homology to
Y. pestis,  Y. pseudotuberculosis, and Y. enterocolitica.
DNA was extracted from 200 µL of sputum by using the
QIAamp DNA Blood Mini Kit (Qiagen, Valencia, CA,
USA) and manufacturer’s protocol. Atotal of 5 µLextract-
ed DNA from the sputum or a positive control (Y. pestis
strain CO 92) or negative control (water) was added to
each reaction. PCR conditions were as previously
described (16). Expected amplicon sizes were 531 bp
(caf1), 833 bp (repA1), and 480 bp (pla). PCR was carried
out by using puReTaq Ready-To-Go PCR Beads
(Amersham Biosciences, Piscataway, NJ, USA).
Direct Fluorescent-Antibody Test 
Sputum was vigorously vortexed to disrupt the semisol-
id mass, then centrifuged at 8,000 × g for 5 min to pellet
the solid material. The pellet was washed once in phos-
phate-buffered saline (PBS) and resuspended in 75 µLo f
PBS. Approximately 5 µL of concentrated sputum was
used for direct fluorescent-antibody (DFA) microscopy as
previously described (17) and visualized at 400× magnifi-
cation. 
Results
Cluster Description
We identified 1 definite and 3 probable pneumonic
plague cases, comprising 2 concurrent index patient–care-
giver pairs. We refer to the pairs as Aand B, with numbers
1 and 2 designating index and caregiver cases within each
pair, respectively. Index patient B1 became ill 1 day before
cough onset in index patient A1. Despite extensive inves-
tigation, we identified no social links between these 2
index patients and no evidence of contact in the week
before patient A1’s illness onset. We identified no other ill-
nesses clinically compatible with pneumonic plague
occurring in December 2004 in Kango Subcounty by
active surveillance. All case-patients’ disease symptoms
are shown by onset day in the Table. Overall, compared
with index patients, caregivers’ illnesses progressed more
rapidly, including quicker bloody sputum onset (mean 1
vs. 6 days).
Index patient A1 was a 22-year-old woman, and her pri-
mary caregiver, patient A2, was her 40-year-old mother.
According to family members, patient A1’s illness began
with several days of headache, fever, and chills.
Lymphadenopathy was first observed on day 3. Coughing,
first noted on day 5, became productive a day later and
bloody sputum was noted on day 7. On day 6, she was seen
by a drug shop owner (a government-trained nursing assis-
tant) and treated for malaria with 3 days of chloroquine.
On day 9, she was coughing frank blood and died later that
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ill 5 days after her daughter’s death. On the first day of
patient A2’s illness, she reported headache, fever, chills,
weakness, chest pain, and a productive cough. The same
private drug shop owner examined her and reported ulcer-
ative pharyngitis, a sign associated with inhalational expo-
sure to Y. pestis (12), but not lymphadenopathy. The
patient was treated with intramuscular penicillin (6 treat-
ments over 36 h) for presumptive severe pneumonia. The
next day grossly bloody sputum developed, and she died
on illness day 3. 
Index patient B1 was a 25-year-old man, and his pri-
mary caregiver, patient B2, was his 30-year-old sister.
Index patient B1’s illness began with headache, fever, and
chills. His family sought care for him at a private drug
shop and transported him to 3 government health centers.
Lymphadenopathy was not reported, although his clini-
cians did not specifically examine him for it. He received
antimalaria treatment and intramuscular penicillin for pre-
sumptive severe pneumonia. His cough became productive
with bloody sputum on day 5 of illness, and he died on day
6. Patient B1’s primary caregiver, B2, became ill 5 days
after patient B1’s death. 
Surviving caregiver B2 was identified the day the out-
break was reported, a day after her illness onset. She was
markedly dyspneic, ill-appearing, with an elevated oral
temperature and respiratory rate (39.3°C and 56
breaths/min, respectively). She required assistance to
walk. She had no palpable lymph nodes. A pulmonary
examination showed marked chest indrawing and bilateral
coarse crepitations. She was first treated 29 h after illness
onset at the local health center, where she received chlo-
ramphenicol, 2 g intravenously as a single bolus, and
doxycycline, 100 mg orally. 
On her arrival at Nyapea Hospital, a grossly bloody
sputum sample was obtained (Figure 1A). Because hospi-
tal staff were unaware of her previous treatment, she was
retreated with chloramphenicol, 1 g intravenously, given 1
h and 45 min after her initial dose. She continued treatment
with chloramphenicol, 1 g intravenously every 6 h for 48
h, then 750 mg every 6 h (10 days of intravenous treat-
ment). She was discharged at day 10 and received oral
chloramphenicol, 750 mg every 6 h for 8 additional days.
On discharge, she was able to walk 1 mile to her home
from the nearest road but with difficulty and shortness of
breath. Three weeks after being discharged, she reported
having returned to all usual activities including subsistence
farming.
A series of 3 frontal chest radiographs taken on days 2,
3, and 18 of illness demonstrated bilateral airspace disease,
predominantly in lower lung zones, with bilateral (right >
left) pleural effusions without evidence of hilar or medi-
astinal lymphadenopathy (Figure 2). Findings were consis-
tent with multilobar pneumonia with progressive
diminution in airspace disease and pleural effusions over
time. 
Presence of Y. pestis in the surviving patient’s sputum
was verified by positive PCR results for genes on all 3 of
the Y. pestis plasmids (Figure 1B), and DFAshowing clas-
sic fluorescent staining halos of bacteria with Y. pestis-spe-
cific antibody (Figure 1C). Two handheld assays also
detected  Y. pestis antigen in the sputum. The sputum,
which was obtained 1.5 h after her first antimicrobial drug
dose, stored overnight without refrigeration, and transport-
ed the next day to the central laboratory (6 h in transport),
did not yield Y. pestis on bacterial culture. A complete
blood count at illness day 20 was within normal limits.
Antibody to Y. pestis was not detected in serum from
acute-phase blood samples. The patient declined to pro-
vide a sample for convalescent-phase serologic testing at a
follow-up visit 3 weeks after discharge. The other 3 case-
patients were already buried when the outbreak was report-
ed; therefore, autopsies and laboratory verification of their
plague diagnoses were not attempted.
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Figure 1. A) Grossly bloody sputum sample obtained from the surviving patient (caregiver B2) 30 h after onset of primary pneumonic
plague. B) Polymerase chain reaction results of sputum sample from caregiver B2. Lanes 1–3, caf1; lanes 4–6, repA1; lanes 7–9, pla.
Lanes 1, 4, and 7 are positive controls; lanes 2, 5, and 8 are patient samples; lanes 3, 6, and 9 are negative controls.  C) Anti-F1 direct
fluorescent antibody staining of sputum sample from caregiver B2. Numerous bacteria with classic halo structures are characteristic of
Yersinia pestis. The circled bacterium classically depicts this halo.Contact Tracing and Prophylaxis
Close contacts of index patients A1 and B1 are
described in the Appendix Table (available from
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no03/05-1051_
app.htm). These contacts were not given antimicrobial
drug prophylaxis because >1 week had passed since the
index patients’ deaths when the outbreak was reported.
Twenty-five persons had direct contact with either patient
(i.e., touched) after onset of cough productive of bloody
sputum and before death, but only the 2 primary caregivers
became ill (attack rate 2/25, 8%).
Examples of these index patients’ close contacts
include the following. Patient A1 slept in the same bed as
her husband and 1.5-year-old daughter in a 1.8 × 3.1 × 2.0m
bedroom the night before her death. The night before index
patient B1’s death, he slept in the same bed as his 6-year-
old daughter until the early morning, when his wife noted
he was very ill and coughing bloody sputum. His daughter
then moved to a straw mat on the floor of the 4 × 4 × 1.6
m windowless 1-room house with her mother and 3 sib-
lings, who had been sleeping there. Their heads were ≈1.8
m from their father’s. 
On index patient B1’s last day, he was placed in a chair
strapped on the back of a bicycle and transported 18 km to
obtain medical care at several clinics. His 3 brothers who
held him upright during this trip remained well without
prophylaxis. In addition, ≈200 persons attended the 2
index patients’ funerals; ≈75 persons touched the blanket
that wrapped index patient B1’s body, the same blanket
that was used during the patient’s final days of illness. No
contacts used masks, gloves, or any other form of respira-
tory protection. 
All identified close contacts of caregivers A2 and B2
received chemoprophylaxis (3 days of cotrimoxazole, 960
mg orally, twice a day), including 14 members of caregiv-
er A2’s family compound, 8 members of caregiver B2’s
family compound, and 4 healthcare providers who rode
without masks in the ambulance with caregiver B2.
Prophylaxis was initiated 4 days after caregiver A2’s
death, 2 days after caregiver B2’s treatment initiation, and
on the day of the ambulance ride, respectively.
Additionally, local health authorities gave prophylaxis to
200 attendees of caregiver A2’s funeral on the day of the
funeral, which took place the morning after A2’s death, the
same day the outbreak was reported. 
Community Surveillance 
No additional pneumonic plague cases were identified
during December and in the weeks after the outbreak
report. However, through active surveillance we identified
3 probable bubonic plague patients who came to the sub-
county’s local health center in the first half of January, an
increase from a baseline of 0 cases per month in the pre-
ceding 3 months. In addition, during the investigation in
late December and early January, several villages in the
subcounty reported rat deaths, and both index patients’
families reported finding dead rats in their family com-
pounds before the index patients’ illness onset.
Discussion
We report 4 pneumonic plague cases involving 2
instances of person-to-person transmission. Even without
appropriate treatment, the 2 index patients survived >1
week. The index patients transmitted pneumonic plague,
likely in their final hours of life, to only their primary
caregivers, despite numerous other close contacts. This
transmission pattern is compatible with respiratory
droplet transmission rather than transmission by aerosols
(droplet nuclei). Furthermore, only a few close contacts,
who were all within droplet range, became ill. Primary
pneumonic plague developed in the primary caregivers,
who displayed a more fulminant clinical course. However,
1 survived without residual functional limitation after
chloramphenicol treatment initiated 29 h after illness
RESEARCH
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Figure 2. Serial frontal chest radiographs from surviving caregiver B2 with primary pneumonic plague obtained on illness days 2, 3, and
18, showing bilateral lower lung zone predominant airspace disease associated with right>left pleural effusions. The radiographs have
artifacts related to hand-dipping of films, which account for multiple densities that move between images and areas of apparent lucency.onset, which is later than commonly thought useful
(11,12,14).
We identified 23 close contacts of the 2 index patients
who remained well without antimicrobial drug prophylax-
is or other form of protection, including 3 family members
who slept in the same bed and many persons who slept
with their heads at a distance <2 m from the coughing
plague patient. Some published literature describes pneu-
monic plague as highly contagious (9,12) through aerosols
(droplet nuclei) (13). However, other researchers have
reported that transmission requires prolonged close contact
at the end stage of illness (2,18,19), which is consistent
with respiratory droplet transmission (1,20). This investi-
gation supports the latter view. Furthermore, droplet range
is usually <3 feet (21), and all identified close contacts
were well within that proximity to an index patient, but
few (8%) became ill. Transmission likely occurred on the
index patients’ final day of life, given the 5-day interval
until caregiver symptom onset after the index patients’
death (incubation period usually 2–4 days, range 1–6)
(2,19). Consistent with our findings, Gani and Leach’s
review of pneumonic plague outbreaks reported an aver-
age 1.3 pneumonic plague transmissions to other persons
per pneumonic plague case (22). An investigation of a larg-
er outbreak in Madagascar that used serologic testing to
confirm plague infections also reported an attack rate
among close contacts similar to ours (8.4%), although a
definition of close contacts was not reported (23).
Our patients’ clinical course provides clues to why
pneumonic plague patients usually infect few persons and
why, for example, an air travel–associated outbreak would
be unlikely. Our case-patients were visibly short of breath,
coughing grossly bloody sputum, and barely ambulatory
before transmitting the disease. Thus, when patients are
substantially contagious, they are unlikely to be traveling
by air and, if so, would appear ill enough to alarm nearby
passengers. In most settings, persons this ill are at home or
in the hospital. Recent reviews support this observation
because most reported pneumonic plague transmissions
involve family, friends, or medical professionals caring for
ill persons at home or in the hospital (2,22). 
A current IDSA summary on Y. pestis as a bioterrorism
agent notes, “in the absence of early therapy (i.e., within
the first 24 h), death occurs from overwhelming sepsis”
(14). This follows Butler’s widely cited reviews, which
state that pneumonic plague is “invariably fatal” if treated
>20–24 h after illness onset (11,12) and cite the 1956
report of McCrumb et al. (24). More recent reviews (25)
and other literature (26,27) indicate that survival is possi-
ble even when treatment is initiated after 24 h, consistent
with caregiver B2’s survival. This caregiver received chlo-
ramphenicol, the only parenteral drug designated as a
national standard plague treatment in Uganda (28), 29 h
after illness onset, and survived without supportive care
(i.e., mechanical ventilation or oxygen therapy). In the
United States, chloramphenicol is a second- or third-line
plague treatment (1,29) because no randomized clinical tri-
als have been conducted to document its comparability
with accepted treatments and because it has potential
hematologic side effects (1). Although caregiver B2
received supratherapeutic doses because of a communica-
tion error, experienced Ugandan clinicians report success
treating plague, including pneumonic plague, with chlo-
ramphenicol, 500 mg intravenously every 6 h (30).
Clinical diagnosis of pneumonic plague is challenging,
particularly without lymphadenopathy. Even in this
plague-endemic area these cases were not suspected to be
plague until an investigation was initiated after the third
death. All 4 cases had 1 classic pneumonic plague feature:
productive cough progressing to grossly bloody sputum
(2,18,19). In plague-endemic regions, respiratory illnesses
<1 week in duration with bloody or blood-tinged sputum
should prompt consideration of a pneumonic plague diag-
nosis and empiric antimicrobial drug treatment for plague.
Routine chest radiographs cannot be expected to establish
a pneumonic plague diagnosis. The chest radiographs of
surviving caregiver B2 were consistent with but not
uniquely diagnostic for primary pneumonic plague. As
with the few other published radiographs of primary pneu-
monic plague patients (1,24,27,31–33), these radiographic
findings alone would not prompt clinicians to consider
pneumonic plague without a preexisting clinical suspicion.
In our cluster, primary pneumonic plague (direct airway
infection) progressed rapidly to life-threatening illness. In
contrast, respiratory symptoms developed later in illness
for the apparent secondary pneumonic plague patients,
consistent with hematogenous spread from an alternate site
of infection initiation, and their symptoms progressed
more slowly. The more fulminant clinical course of pri-
mary pneumonic plague could help differentiate primary
versus secondary pneumonic plague in naturally occurring
outbreaks and pneumonic plague suspected of being
caused by an intentional bacterial release because aerosol
exposure would result in primary pneumonic plague. Time
course of clinical progression can be established retrospec-
tively from history alone, in contrast to lymphadenopathy
(a bubo), which can also help differentiate primary and
secondary pneumonic plague but requires a thorough
physical examination. A bubo indicates that pneumonic
plague is most likely secondary to a primary bubonic
plague infection (14).
Upon hearing of 4 cases in close proximity, our initial
assumption was these cases were linked. However, closer
investigation demonstrated that the second patient became
ill before the first patient developed cough, and these 2
patients had no apparent contact during the week before
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of each other but were from different villages and tribal
backgrounds. This coincidence indicates the importance of
detailed contact investigations before pneumonic plague
cases are declared linked in areas with ongoing epizootics.
The cluster is likely explained by the annual epizootic
reaching the area and difficulty diagnosing pneumonic
plague. Because the 2 index patients lived near each other,
they were likely both exposed to the same epizootic (i.e.,
plague-infected rats and fleas). Since their illnesses went
unrecognized and were not appropriately treated, the
patients each transmitted their infection to their caregivers,
creating this 4-case cluster. 
Among the investigation’s limitations, we depended on
family members’ recall for information on deceased
patients’ symptoms and activities. However, we believe
multiple family member interviews and rapid investigation
initiation minimized information loss. Another limitation
was our inability to culture Y. pestis from the surviving
patient’s sputum, which likely resulted from administra-
tion of an antimicrobial drug before sputum collection and
suboptimal specimen storage and transport. However, we
verified plague infection by laboratory analysis of this spu-
tum sample, including amplification of all 3 targeted
plague plasmids by PCR and visualization of numerous
bacteria with classic halos of Y. pestis by DFA staining.
Additionally, the sputum tested strongly positive with both
Y. pestis antigen dipsticks. Finally, we could not verify all
cases through laboratory analysis because 3 case-patients
had been buried by the time the outbreak was reported.
However, high death rate, fulminant clinical course, labo-
ratory verification for the surviving case, and clinical
symptoms were consistent with plague. The concomitant
bubonic plague increase and reports of rat deaths provide
additional support that plague was endemic during this
outbreak. 
In conclusion, this investigation illustrates the clinical
course of pneumonic plague, contrasts secondary and pri-
mary disease, and shows the relatively low communicabil-
ity of pneumonic plague even with numerous close
contacts. This information should guide bioterrorism
response planning and the public health response to natu-
rally occurring pneumonic plague outbreaks. 
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